The notes help us to see how writing the article restored some of Russell's "self-respect". In May of 1902 Russell had completed The Principles of Mathematics and then made a study of the works by Frege and others including Meinong in order to add notes and the Appendices to the Principles before it was published in 1903. Beginning in June of 1902 Russell conducted a correspondence with Frege while struggling with the paradoxes. "Meinong's Theory" was written in April of 1903, and thus well before "On Denoting" which Russell considered to be a step toward the ultimate resolution of the paradoxes. The focus of the article is on Meinong's theory of assumptions, which are his version of the theory of propositions that Russell and Moore had proposed. The main theses of "Meinong's Theory" are drawn to our attention by observing the distribution and topics of the notes.
3
The sheer bulk of the notes for "Meinong's Theory", and the fact that it does not contain much of the famous objections to "Meinongian objects", shows that Russell's interest in Meinong was not destroyed by his discovery of those objections, nor does it seem that his primary goal in studying Meinong was to refute his general approach in volume no. 70 in Russell's library. 3 See Douglas Lackey's introduction to "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions" in EA. The editor's introduction is on pp. 17-20, and the article pp. 20-76. of using "objects" to account for logical phenomena. This only seems to have emerged out of Russell's disagreement with Meinong about propositions. Meinong held that in presentations such as those of perception, the object presented does exist, but for an illusion or impossible object such as the round square, the object is only immanent. Russell, following Moore and Frege, held that a proposition is always a "transcendent" object to which we are related in thought:
Meinong holds-so it would seem-that the object of a presentation is sometimes immanent, but at other times not so; while the object of a judgment-which he calls an Objective, and I call a proposition-is always purely immanent (p. 257). Now for my part I do not see how an immanent object differs from no object at all. The immanent object does not exist, according to Meinong, and is therefore no part of the mental state whose object it is; for this mental state exists. Yet, although not part of any mental state, it is supposed to be in some sense psychical. But it cannot be in any way bound up with any particular mental state of which it is the object; for other states, at other times and in other people, may have precisely the same object, since an object or a proposition can be presented or believed more than once. I confess these facts seem to me to show, without more ado, that objects and propositions must always have being, and cannot be merely imaginary relata for what appears as a relation of presentation or judgment.
(Papers 4: 461)
Russell's objection to Meinong's account of propositions as non-existent were coeval with his worries about non-existent objects such as the round square. Russell had an attitude towards Meinong that resembles his assessment of Frege. Russell had much in common with both thinkers; however, he is most famous for producing devastating logical objections to their views. For Frege it was "Russell's Paradox" of the set of all sets that do not belong to themselves, and for Meinong it was objections to non-existent objects such as "the round square".
In a letter to Meinong dated 15 December 1904, Russell summarizes his attitude towards Ueber Annahmen:
I find myself in almost complete agreement with the general viewpoint and the problems dealt with seem to be very important. I myself have been accustomed to use the name "Logic" for that which you call "Theory of Objects", and the reasons you cite against this use on p. 20ff appear to me to be hardly decisive.… I have always believed until now that every object must be in some sense, and I find it difficult to recognize nonexistent objects. In a case such as the golden mountain or the round square one must distinguish between sense and reference (in accordance with Frege's distinction).
4
In the article Russell opposes Meinong's doctrine that distinguishes assumption as the relation to an "objective" (Objectiv), or proposition, from the relation of presentation of objects (Vorstellung) in perception or illusion. Russell counters that assumption is simply the presentation of a proposition. Understanding this helps to properly explain the assertion now known as "Russell's Principle" from "On Denoting":
Thus in every proposition that we can apprehend (i.e. not only in those whose truth or falsehood we can judge of, but in all that we can think about), all the constituents are really entities with which we have immediate acquaintance.
(OD, Papers 4: 427)
Russell's Principle in fact asserts that the relation of apprehending or being able to think about a proposition, as in an assumption, is the very same relation of acquaintance or presentation which relates us to the objects which are constituents of that proposition. Russell held the view that in order to be thinking about an object or to make a judgment about an object, one must know which object is in question-one must know which object it is that one is thinking about.
We learn from these notes for "Meinong's Theory" that for Russell acquaintance was an intentional relation to a "transcendent" object,
Translated in an appendix (pp. 347-8) Russell states the principle as: "Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted", PP2 (New York oup edn.), p. 58. rather than a relation to direct objects of experience as in the empiricist tradition. There is no intimate connection between acquaintance with an object and being able to "identify" or to "know which" thing it is to any extent, nor is "apprehending" a judgment more than the non-linguistic relation of "assumption", and so not "understanding" in the sense of some sort of knowledge.
In addition to this important lesson from studying Russell's notes we also find the first occurrence of Russell's famous "infinite regress argument" for the existence of universals. In the notes on "Abstrahieren und Vergleichen" we find:
p. 67 Comparison-theory supposes similarity of a and b discovered by that of , and , . Hence endless regress. p. 68 This regress, unlike many, is objectionable, since its beginning, not its end, goes to infinity.
This is clearly an anticipation of the argument for universals that Russell later used in Chapter ix of The Problems of Philosophy. 7 While Russell had an enduring interest in regress arguments, beginning with the problem of "the unity of the proposition" in Principles of Mathematics §54, this appears to be the first appearance of a regress argument related to the similarity of objects and their sharing of properties.
about the notes
The 29 sheets of notes for Russell's article and review are combined in one file: ra 230.030450. The fifteen sheets of notes for the first, "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions", cover the two works that are discussed in the article, "Ueber Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhaltnis zur innerenen Wahrnehmung" and Ueber Annahmen, as well as Russell's notes on "Abstrahieren und Vergleichen", which is merely mentioned in the article. The notes have been numbered here as (i ) through (xv) as they appear in the Archives file. Explaining Russell's own numbering (or "foliation") and the 7 PP2 (New York oup edn.), p. 96. I am grateful to Katerina Perovic of the University of Iowa for pointing out the history of Russell's "regress argument" and its occurrence in "Meinong's Theory" at p. 437, where it is a regress for the relation relating a relation R to the objects a and b it relates when aRb. This is the regress familiar from the "problem of the unity of the proposition" from PoM, §54.
order in which the notes were taken is complicated. Leaf (i ) is on the left-hand side of a folded sheet and contains notes on Ueber Annahmen from pages 257-79. 8 It matches leaf (xiv verso), which is on the leftand right-hand side of the sheet and covers Ueber Annahmen, pages 178-208. It appears that these three half-sheets of notes were written at a different time from others, as they are written in pencil, as opposed to the ink of all the other notes, and they duplicate material in the foliated series (xiv recto covers pages 150-75 of Ueber Annahmen, and xv covers 150-83). That leaf (i ) and page (xiv verso lhs) are both foliated "1" further complicates the issue. The hypothesis which is proposed here is that Russell wrote the notes in four different groups. The four leaves of notes on "Ueber Gegenstände"-(ii ) to (v), which are foliated by Russell as 1 to 4-may have been made much earlier, as this work was published in 1899. The two leaves of notes on "Abstrahieren und Vergleichen"-(vi ) and (vii ), foliated 1 and 2-may also have been earlier, at some time after the article's publication in 1900. Russell started the notes on Ueber Annahmen with the seven leaves (viii ) to (xiii) and (xv), and numbered them 1-7. What remains to be explained are sheets (i ), numbered 1, and in pencil on the left-hand side of a sheet with 2 on the blank right side; (xiv recto), in ink and unnumbered; and (xiv verso), in pencil, on left-and right-hand sides, numbered 2 and 1 respectively.
There is some duplication of material in the notes on Ueber Annahmen, as both leaves (xiv recto and verso) and (xv) contain notes from the start of Chapter 7, with notes on each of pages 150, 151-2, 153, 154, 156, 159, 163, 166, 174, 175, 179, 182 and 183 . One explanation of this series of notes is that Russell returned to his notes on Ueber Annahmen, perhaps when composing part iii of "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions", which deals primarily with Chapter 7, "The Objective", and later. He may have started at his desk, with ink, taking notes on leaf (xiv recto), which is not numbered, taking notes on the same pages as he did on (xv), and adding notes on pages 155, 157, 164, 168 and 169; so, five more notes. Then, moving to a different place, away from ink, but with a pencil, he turned (xiv) over and folded it in half, numbering the right-hand side 1 and the left- hand side 2, and filled it with notes on pages 178-208 of Ueber Annahmen. Finally, he took a second sheet of blank paper (i ), folded it and numbered the left-hand side 1 and the right-hand side 2, and finished his notes on Ueber Annahmen on the left-hand side with notes on pages 257-79 (skipping Chapter 8 "On the Psychology of Desire and Value" on pages 212-54). The book ends eight pages later on 287 with general remarks. The occasional passages in pencil on (viii ) to (xiii ) and (xv) were clearly added after the originals in ink.
When in the original a passage continues from one page to the next, Russell indicated it in the notes by including the new page number where this occurs, sometimes in the middle of a sentence. For example on (ii ) a note on page 185 continues mid-sentence to page 186. Russell began most notes on a new line with a page number on the left. In the following transcription, for ease of reference, the sentence is continued on a new line with the new page reference. Notes that are used in the published paper are indicated with a bold reference to the page on which the citation occurs. They are listed by the part of "Meinong's Theory" in which they occur, i.e. i, ii or iii, followed by the page in the Collected Papers edition on which each occurs. Thus the first note, on leaf (i ), which cites page 257 of Ueber Annahmen, is used in part ii of "Meinong's Theory" on page 461 in Papers 4. The annotation of that note is thus II, 461.
There are a handful of page references in the published papers that do not appear in the notes. These include a reference to "Ueber Gegenstände" at Papers 4: 441: "Indeed, as Meinong himself says (p. 210), materialism is the natural view of the plain man." Second, at Papers 4: 449 there is a reference to page 50 of Ueber Annahmen after: "And this is why liars tend to believe their own lies-a mere presentation would not be so liable to turn into a judgment." There are more such references to Ueber Annahmen in "Meinong's Theory" which do not appear in the notes, viz. at pages 55, 61, 121, 134 and 261-5 (a whole passage for which there are no notes but several marginal comments in Russell's copy of Ueber Annahmen). This all indicates that Russell worked mostly from his notes, but that he also looked through the texts again when composing the papers and did not rely solely on his notes. p. 185 That everything psychological must have an object will be admitted at least for presentations and judgments. But many think object much the same as content. But object may not exist: may be p. 186 self-contradictory, not a fact, a relation such as equality, or something which did or will exist. But content of presentation exists when presentation exists. Existence of an object in presentation is no existence: might be called pseudo-existence. I, 435 p. 187 Also physical as well as psychological can be presented: but content always psychological. I, 435 p. 188 What all presentations have in common is the act of presentation itself.-Presentations of different objects differ, and differ in respect of content. Content tends to be ignored in favour of object. I, 435 p. 189 There are no natural designations for contents: they must be named by objects.-Some objects have an intrinsic lack of independence: e.g. diversity. Can't think 9
In addition Russell marked two typographical errors: at p. 88 n.1 he corrected "implicirte"; and on p. In pencil in margin: "(cf. p. 236)".
12
In margin, at an angle: "Mem".
content: it gives also the (immanent) object. This involves a fundamental problem in theory of knowledge. I, 438; III, 465 p. 208 Seeing is less perceptible to internal perception than what is seen. I, 438 p. 209 Internal perception reveals feelings as well as objects: but seems to reveal nothing else. The objection comes to this: that internal perception reveals only physical objects and feelings; or, since latter easily confused with sensations, perhaps only physical objects. I, 438 p. 211 But we must be more careful in questioning empirically. p. 212 A thing is only perceived when its existence is immediately known (i.e. without other premisses), and exists at (at least practically) the same time as the knowledge. This is not quite exact: e.g. fixed stars: but the inexactnesses apply specially to external perception. A perception is characterized as internal (1) This will remind the reader of the argument for the existence of universals in Chapter 9 of The Problems of Philosophy. 17 Russell used his logical notation "∃ " for "that there is something in (2) which is not in (1) Gegenstände are connected necessarily with their fundaments, but negations (e.g. stones do not rise) are often not necessary. Thus not-A as such has no necessity, and is therefore not a founded object. But it is also not an object which is not founded; p. 13
Hence not-A is not an object at all: Q.E.D.
[I disagree with this conclusion: the argument as to necessity appears to me to be faulty.] II, 446
It is true, "something of which the judgment holds that it is not red" is a negative object, which we may call not-red; but it involves, beyond Gestalten, also negative judgment and notion of that of which it holds. This introduction of psychological and epistemological (?) elements is remarkable. But when we examine negative presentations, we find (except perhaps in rare cases) no trace of any such roundabout process. Hence this interpretation must be ignored in future.
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II, 446
18 This is Russell's comment. In Ueber Annahmen Meinong only suggests that it might be best to use two different words for the two senses. ' expresses difference.
19
Marginal comment on p. 13: "I see no such things in ≡ ∼ ε ".
p. 14 The right to do 〈next word in pencil above deleted "say":〉 so may be enforced by observing the difference of , and ; ε ; ɜ , . Thus opposition of yes and no makes no difference to act of presentation, and can only be applied by an artificial and roundabout process to the object and therefore to the content of presentation. II, 446 p. 15
The opposition never arises with mere presentation. Annahmen are involved in ⊃ : for we needn't assert and , but either may be a negation, which presupposes that we are not concerned with mere presentation. p. 86 Conclusions from unasserted premisses are not hypothetical judgments in the ordinary sense, but genuine conclusions; only they result in and start from Annahmen, not judgments. p. 87 Hypothetical judgments don't assert a relation of and q: e.g. "If a perpendicular is drawn from the vertex of an isosceles triangle onto the base, the base is bisected." This is not a mere presentation; but it seems to be not a judgment. It can't be p. 88 negation: "If , need not be true" deals with must, and denies something different. Here, a relation is denied of and . (1) In the judgment that A exists, it is not A that is the object, but A's existence; for if it were A, we should say that the judgment has an actual object when it is true, whereas "A does not exist" would only have an actual object when it is false. (2) All judgments have an object equally, and in the same sense, apart from truth or falsehood. (3) The object of a judgment is not an asserted, but an unasserted proposition, not "A exists" but "the existence of A". Assertion occurs psychologically when any true or false proposition is affirmed; logically, only when a proposition is true. But assertion, logically, is not merely a relation to truth, for " 's truth" is still unasserted.] 2 questions: (1) In what sense has negative judgment objectivity, if this means a property which the judgment would have under circumstances which its own truth requires to be unfulfilled? (2) In what sense can we say a judgment has an object if this object (as in true negative judgments) does not exist? II, 452 p. 98 The object which a negative or false proposition would have if affirmative and true it doesn't have. What objects there really is 〈sic〉 belongs only to the presentation involved: i.e. the presentation always has an object. II, 452 p. 99 But the object of the presentation may not exist: the presentation has Gegenständlichkeit only in the sense of having a certain capacity for an object.
[How about the idea of 2?] II, 452 p. 100 There is however a difficulty: capacities are facts, but not perceivable
ones. Yet the objectivity of presentations does seem perceivable. Annahmen to the rescue! II, 452 p. 101 Difficulty only in regard to objects of presentations and negative judgments: affirmative judgments obviously objective when true, and falsehood can't make any difference. [Assume affirmative judgments existential?] 24 Presentation is accompanied p. 102 by affirmative Annahme, when it has objectivity which is not merely potential. A round square has p. 103 objectivity, and this is because it can be subject of an affirmative Annahme. Thus objectivity is better based on the Annahme than on the judgment. Gegenständlichkeit is capacity of a presentation to be Grundlage of an affirmative Annahme; a presentation is auf einem Gegenstand gerichtet 25 when its content is made the content of an affirmative Annahme. This weakens the notion of object, but makes it applicable to all presentations. 26 II, 452
hoarsely repeating in the black night the lesson of irrevocable loss. These, then, are the Gods. Do these deserve our worship?
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Russell took this from his marginal comment on p. 101: "Seems to assume positive judgments all existential." 25 auf einem Gegenstand gerichtet is directed towards an object.
26
On the next page, 103: 10-11, Meinong asserts that "Die Annahme is ja durch den Satz des Widerspruches in keine Weise gebunden" [Assumptions are in no way bound by the law of non-contradiction], yet Russell did not remark on it. 27 Russell recycled this sheet of paper with only two lines on it. The sentence is reminiscent of "A Free Man's Worship" (Papers 12: 4), an essay originally published in The Independent Review in 1903, but the sentence does not belong to it. In the Autobiography (i: 150) he says of this difficult time: "I tried to take refuge in pure contemplation; I began to write The Free Man's Worship. The construction of prose rhythms was the only thing in which I found any real consolation." This was the same time that completing "Meinong's Theory" added "Some few shreds of selfrespect" (Papers 12: 22 Marginal comment on p. 152: "Propositions are objects".
31
The German is "Objectität" and "Objectivität".
32
Russell put a question mark "?" next to this remark in the margin of p. 157. 33 These two pages (1 and 2) are side by side on the verso of sheet (xiv), which is folded in half. This is to the right of the fold. These notes are also on Ueber Annahmen.
34
In the margin of p. 178 next to Meinong's comparison of the German expressions "Dass Frostwetter bevorsteht" and "das Bevorstehen des Frostwetters", Russell commented: "This does not apply in English". ditto of "blackness of board"-Black is object of presentation, but "the black" is object of thought. 
39
This sentence ends incompletely. This notetaking session may have come to an abrupt end here.
